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The Birth of a Tort Liability Theory? Legal Remedies for Families of Children Who 
Inherit Genetic Diseases from Gamete Donors 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The advancement of assisted reproductive technology (ART) now means that for 
many would-be parents it takes more than just two to make a baby. But as ART practices 
such as sperm donation and in vitro fertilization become more available and affordable 
for individuals seeking to have a child, the risks of such practices are also becoming more 
evident. One of these risks is the risk of children conceived through gamete donations 
inheriting a genetic disease from a donor.   
 Instances of this happening are no longer just anecdotal. In 2009, the Journal of 
the American Medical Association (JAMA) reported on an outwardly healthy sperm 
donor with no known infectious or genetic diseases who transmitted the genetic heart 
disease hypertrophic cardiomyopathy to nine of the twenty-two children conceived using 
his sperm.
1
 In the court cases discussed in this paper, children inherited autosomal 
dominant polycystic kidney disease
2
, cystic fibrosis
3
, and Fragile X syndrome
4
 from their 
sperm or egg donors. A recent news article described the legal battle between a 
gestational surrogate and the recipient couple over the severely disabled child she was 
                                                        
1 Barry J. Maron, M.D. et al, Implications of Hypertrophic Cardiomyopathy Transmitted by Sperm 
Donation, 302 JAMA No. 15, 1681 (2009).  
2 Johnson v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles, 95 Cal. Rptr.2d 864, 868 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2000), review denied 
124 Cal. Rptr.2d 650 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).  
3 Paretta v. Med. Offices for Human Reproduction, 760 N.Y.S.2d 639, 641-42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).  
4 Donovan v. Idant Labs., 625 F. Supp.2d 256, 263 (E.D. Pa. 2009), aff’d in D.D. v. Id..ant Labs., 374 
Fed.Appx. 319, 2010 WL 1257705 (C.A.3 (Pa.) 2010).  
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carrying, after the surrogate learned one month before the child’s birth that the baby was 
conceived using an anonymous egg donor, rather than the couple’s eggs and semen as she 
had been led to believe
5
.  
 Although the legal and medical communities have voiced concerns about the risk 
of inheriting genetic diseases from gamete donors and the need for state and federal 
regulation of ART practitioners, few prescriptive measures have been put in place.
6
 As 
evidenced in the cases below, many parents of children conceived using a gamete donor 
only learn of their children’s inherited genetic illness after the child is born. Those 
families faced with the challenge of a child with a serious genetic disease or disorder 
need to be able to pursue post-birth remedies in court.  
 This paper limits itself to discussing legal claims where a child has inherited a 
genetic disease or disorder from a sperm or egg donor. Section I provides background 
information on the current state of ART procedures and the genetic screening and testing 
options currently available. Section II discusses oversight of gamete testing and screening 
standards and other preventative measures at the federal and state levels of government 
and also in the private sector. Section III examines the claims in common that have been 
brought by parents and children in state and federal courts against ART practitioners, 
gamete banks, and gamete donors. It discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the 
common threads of negligence theories in these cases. Since there is very little court 
precedent on this issue, Section IV of this paper proposes how best to build a legal action 
                                                        
5 Elizabeth Cohen, Surrogate Offered $10,000 to Abort Baby, CNN (March 6, 2013, 2:58 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/04/health/surrogacy-kelley-legal-battle/index.html?hpt=hp_c1. 
6 Lisa M. Luetkemeyer, Who’s Guarding the Henhouse and What Are They Doing with Eggs (and Sperm)? 
A Call for Increased Regulation of Gamete Donation and Long-Term Tracking of Donor Gametes, 3 St. 
LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 397, 424 (2010), Suriya E.P. Jayanti, Comment, Guarantors of our Genes: 
Are Egg Donors Liable for Latent Genetic Disease? 58 AM. U. L. REV. 405, 411 (2008), Yaniv Heled,  
Article, The Regulation of Genetic Aspects of Donated Reproductive Tissue – The Need for Federal 
Regulation, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 276 (2010). 
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that can allow families to recover and help courts understand this unique but growing 
problem.  
I. A Primer on Assisted Reproduction Using Gamete Donors 
 A. ART Procedures Using Gamete Donors 
 A couple willing but unable to conceive a child can use either donated semen 
from a male donor or donated eggs (oocytes) from a female donor, or both, in order to 
conceive a child.
7
 In some instances, a couple may use both a third-party sperm donor 
and egg donor in a process called embryo donation.
8
 The donors can be anonymous or 
directed (known to the recipient couple).
9
 
 A number of other parties are involved in assisted reproduction besides merely the 
donors and the recipient couple. A physician who deals specifically with infertility 
treatments and assisted reproduction is referred to as a reproductive endocrinologist.
10
 
There is also a team of medical and laboratory technicians, the cryopreservation or 
storage banks for the donated sperm or eggs, and often separate programs who screen 
potential gamete donors.
11
 A couple or individual can go through a fertility clinic or 
specializing physician for donated gametes, go directly to a tissue bank or donor agency, 
or deal directly with a donor (particularly in the case of donated eggs); some assisted 
                                                        
7 Association for Reproductive Medicine, Assisted Reproductive Technologies: A GuId..e for Patients 14 
(2011). Available at 
http://www.reproductivefacts.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/Resources/Patient_Resources/Fact_Sheets
_and_Info_Booklets/ART.pdf.  
8 Association for Reproductive Medicine, Third Party Reproduction: A GuId..e for Patients 12-13 (2012). 
Available at 
http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/Resources/Patient_Resources/Fact_Sheets_and_Info_
Booklets/thirdparty.pdf.  
9 Id. at 4, 10.  
10 What is an Infertility Specialist?,  Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology, available at 
http://www.sart.org/SART_What_Is_An_Infertility_Specialist/ (last visited March 28, 2013).  
11 Resolve: The National Infertility Association, Questions to Ask Series: About Donor Sperm Insemination 
Programs and Sperm Banks (#8) 1.  Available at 
http://familybuilding.resolve.org/site/DocServer/Donor_Sperm_Insemination_Programs_And_Sperm_Ban
ks.pdf?docID..=446 (last visited May 9, 2013).  
 Kilduff 4 
reproduction clinics provide these services in a “all-inclusive” setting.12 Whether these 
various players are grouped under one entity or are operating as separate organizations 
could be very important for legal liability, as will be discussed later.  
 To donate her eggs, a woman undergoes a medical procedure to stimulate 
ovulation.
13
 Her eggs are then “harvested” via a process called transvaginal ultrasound 
aspiration.
14
 By contrast, a man simply ejaculates in order to donate a sample of semen.
15
 
While sperm and resulting embryos can be cryopreserved for storage, the 
cryopreservation of eggs has not proved as viable.
16
 There are a variety of ways that the 
donated gametes are then used to conceive a child.  
 In the case of in vitro fertilization, the donor eggs (or the eggs of one of the 
recipient couple partners) are fertilized with donor sperm (or the sperm of one of the 
recipient couple partners) in a laboratory.
17
 The resulting embryo is then transferred to 
either the uterus of the female partner of the recipient couple or to a woman serving as 
the surrogate “mother” (called a gestational surrogate).18 
 Alternatively, the female partner of a recipient couple can be directly inseminated 
with donated semen.
19
 In the case of “traditional” surrogacy, a surrogate mother uses her 
own eggs and is directly inseminated with the sperm of the male partner of the recipient 
couple.
20
 
                                                        
12 Luetkemeyer, supra note 6, at 403; see also for example, Reproductive Medicine Associates of New 
Jersey, http://www.rmanj.com/360-of-fertility-care/3rd-party-reproduction/, accessed on March 21, 2013.  
13 Third Party Reproduction, supra note 6 at 6-7.  
14 Id. at 7.   
15 Id. at 10.  
16 Id. at 17. 
17 Id. at 7, 18.  
18 Id. at 14.  
19 Id. at 11-12.  
20 Id. at 13-14.  
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 Assisted reproduction using gamete donors is becoming a common practice in the 
United States. In 1988, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (now 
defunct) released a study that indicated there were over 30,000 births a year where 
artificial insemination had been used.
21
 Ten years later, the Institute for Science, Law and 
Technology (ISLAT) Working Group estimated the number of births resulting from 
either sperm or egg donation at 60,000.
22
 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC), which annually publishes its ART Success Rates Report, stated that as of 2010, 
147,260 treatment cycles were started at 443 reporting ART clinics and 61,546 births 
resulted from those cycles.
 23
  These treatment cycles involved only ART procedures 
which handled both sperm and eggs and did not include ART techniques such as artificial 
insemination or ovulation inducement.
 24
 Furthermore, the number of treatment cycles 
performed at fertility clinics or ART facilities had increased from the 107,587 reported in 
2001, and the number of children born after successful ART cycles had also increased 
dramatically from 40,687 in 2001.
25
 The CDC’s preliminary 2011 data showed that 
163,038 ART cycles were performed at 451 reporting clinics, resulting in 61,610 
infants.
26
 The 2011 preliminary numbers show that over one percent of infants born in the 
United States are now conceived using ART.
27
 
                                                        
21 Heled, supra note 6 at 246, citing Office of Technology Assessment, 1988 Survey 3.   
22 Id. at 247, citing ISLAT Working Group, ART into Science: Regulation of Fertility Techniques, 281 
Science 651, 651-2 (1998).  
23 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Society for 
Assisted Reproductive Technology, 2010 Assisted Reproductive Technology Fertility Clinic Success Rates 
Report 21 (2012). Available at http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2010/index.htm and 
http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2010/PDFs/01_ART_2010_Clinic_Report-FM.pdf.  
24 What is Assisted Reproductive Technology?, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (last updated 
April 4, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/art/.   
25 Section 5: ART Trends 2001-2010, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (last updated Februrary 4, 
2013), http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2010/section5.htm.  
26 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 24.  
27 Id.  
 Kilduff 6 
 In short, the practice of ART in the United States seems to be thriving, but as 
described in the next section, practices of genetic testing and screening of gamete donors 
do not seem to be developing in proportion to the demand for ART.  
 B. Current Genetic Screening and Testing Procedures, and Who Is Using Them 
 In the field of ART, several terms are used to describe the process of analyzing a 
gamete donor for genetic disease prior to using that donor’s tissue in an ART procedure. 
Practitioners make reference to “genetic counseling,” “genetic screening” and “genetic 
testing.” These terms sometimes are used interchangeably but can be roughly categorized 
as three methods and are all practiced to some degree in the ART industry. However, the 
data suggests that genetic screening and testing practices are not widely practiced at all 
among ART practitioners prior to actually performing an ART cycle, and current genetic 
practices focus mainly on screening and testing of fetuses and newborns.  
 “Genetic counseling” is an umbrella term that generally refers to the 
communications and advice that a genetic specialist gives to a family.
 28
 In the context of 
ART, genetic counseling can encompass not only the subjects of a genetic disease but 
also paternity and maternity issues but also fertility issues and potential issues with 
carrying a pregnancy to term.
29
 
 However, “Genetic counseling does not equal genetic testing.”30 According to the 
National Human Genome Research Institute, “genetic testing” is “the use of a laboratory 
                                                        
28 Talking Glossary of Genetic Terms: Genetic Counseling, The National Human Genome Research 
Institute, available at http://www.genome.gov/Glossary/index.cfm?Id..=79 (last accessed May 9, 2013).  
29 Marie Schuetzle, MS CGC, Genetic Counseling: An Important Part of Your Care, RESOLVE, FOR THE 
JOURNEY AND BEYOND (Resolve: The National Infertility Association, McLean, VA), Winter 2012. 
Available at http://www.resolve.org/family-building-options/donor-options/genetic-counseling-an-
important-part-of-your-care.html (last visited May 9, 2013).  
30 Id.  
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test to look for genetic variations associated with a disease.”31 In other words, an ART 
couple seeking genetic counseling prior to their procedure could theoretically never be 
subject to genetic testing if the counselor didn’t deem it necessary.32 
 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA), a U.S. government agency which 
regulates some aspects of human tissue donations and tissue banks,
33
 provides a slightly 
more specific definition of “testing” of human reproductive tissue, although its definition 
is not limited to testing for genetic diseases. The FDA defines “testing” as using an FDA-
approved laboratory test (somewhat misleadingly referred to as a “donor screening test”) 
to check the tissue for disease.
34
  
 As of 2003, it was estimated that there were approximately 900 laboratory genetic 
tests on the market;
35
 that number today has surely skyrocketed, and since the FDA is not 
required to monitor all classes of genetic tests, including those that are processed by labs 
“in house,”36 the number of tests approved by the FDA is not reflective of the number of 
genetic tests available to healthcare providers, researches, and consumers. 
 “Genetic screening” is a second common technique that falls under the umbrella 
of genetic counseling, but is arguably also the hardest to define. For instance, just as the 
FDA refers to a genetic test as a “donor screening test,”37 the National Human Genome 
Research Institute defines “genetic screening” as “ the process of testing a population for 
a genetic disease in order to identify a subgroup of people that either have the disease or 
                                                        
31 Talking Glossary of Genetic Terms: Genetic Testing, The National Human Genome Research Institute. 
Available at http://www.genome.gov/Glossary/index.cfm?Id..=88 (last accessed May 9, 2013).  
32 Schuetzle, supra note 29.  
33 21 CFR 1271.1 
34 21 CFR 1271.80  
35 Francis S. Collins, M.D., Ph.D., A Brief Primer on Genetic Testing, presented January 24, 2003. 
Available at http://www.genome.gov/10506784 (last reviewed April 30, 2013).  
36 An Overview of Genetic Testing, The National Human Genome Research Institute. Available at 
http://www.genome.gov/10002335 (last updated January 10, 2013).  
37 Supra note 34. 
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the potential to pass it on to their offspring.”38  The American Association of Tissue 
Banks further complicates the meaning by referring to both “donor screening tests” and 
“diagnostic tests” as methods of “screening” human tissue.39 However, in the instance of 
analyzing human tissue for disease, the FDA defines “screening” primarily as reviewing 
a donor’s medical records for a history or indication of disease. 40  This distinction 
between “screening” through interviews and medical records and “testing” using a 
laboratory test is reflected in state statutes such as New York’s, which has requirements 
of screening for some diseases and testing for others.
41
 
 A specific genetic testing practice performed by ART practitioners is called 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis, or PGD. PGD is the testing of embryos created 
through in vitro fertilization for genetic abnormalities; the practitioner then transfers an 
embryo that tests negative for genetic diseases to the recipient mother.
42
 A related 
technique is preimplantation screening (PGS); while PGD is used to diagnose a specific 
patient’s embryos, usually due to other indications of that patient43, PGD is used to look 
at for a specific set of genetic problems across multiple patients in an effort to reduce 
fertility and pregnancy issues.
44
 PGD is an increasingly common practice, but it occurs 
only after an embryo is created and does not test the donor prior to any ART procedure.
45
 
It is also commonly implemented on the embyros created using the recipient couple’s 
                                                        
38 Talking Glossary of Genetic Terms: Genetic Screening, The National Human Genome Research Institute. 
Available at http://www.genome.gov/Glossary/index.cfm?Id..=87 (last visited May 9, 2013). 
39 American Association of Tissue Banks, GuId..ance Document: Current Good Tissue Practice, 16 (No. 3, 
June 27, 2006).  
40 21 CFR 1271.75 
41 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. Tit. 10, § 52-8.5(b)(2) and N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. Tit. 10, § 52-
8.6 
42 ElpId..a Fragouli, Preimplantation genetic diagnosis: present and future, 24  Assist. Reprod. Genet. 201 
(2007). 
43 Id. at 203.  
44 Id. at 204.  
45 Id. at 201.  
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own sperm and eggs as opposed to an embryo created using a donor’s sperm and eggs.46 
Therefore it is not a genetic testing method targeted at gamete donors. However, it is 
helpful to understand that multiple genetic testing techniques are employed by ART 
practitioners prior to pregnancy.   
 So, given the variety of testing methods available to ART practitioners, how often 
are they actually performed? ART practitioners seem to have broad discretion as to 
whether, when and how to test egg or sperm donors for genetic diseases. The current 
practice is “best described as inconsistent” due to the lack of external oversight.47 In 
2010, ARSM published a survey of 26 sperm banks to evaluate their genetic testing 
practices. The results showed that while the banks did screen for cystic fibrosis and 
perform chromosome and hemoglobin evaluations and screened for a history of Tay-
Sachs disease in donors of Ashkenazi Jewish descent, “The genetic testing performed on 
sperm donors varies significantly at sperm banks across the United States.”48 The study 
also found that different facilities used different types of tests.
49
 In 2013, an ASRM study 
concluded based on a mere thirteen responses that there were comparable inconsistencies 
in how semen donors were screened for genetic disorders, how they were informed and 
whether they were given informed consent for such screening.
50
 By contrast, an ASRM 
study published in 2008 concluded based on 186 responses from reporting clinics that a 
                                                        
46 Resolve: The National Infertility Association, Questions to Ask Series: Questions to Ask If You Are 
ConsId..ering Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (#19B) 1. Available at 
http://familybuilding.resolve.org/site/DocServer/If_You_Are_ConsId..ering_Preimplantation_Genetic_Dia
gnosis.pdf?docID..=453 (last visited May 9, 2013). 
47 Judith F. Daar, JD, Robert G. Brzyski, MD, PhD, Genetic Screening of Sperm and Oocyte Donors: 
Ethical and Policy Implications, 302 JAMA No. 15, 1702, 1703 (2009).   
48 Charles A. Sims, M.D., et al., Genetic testing of sperm donors: survey of current practices, 94 Fertil. 
Steril. 126 (2010). Abstract only available at http://www.fertstert.org/article/S0015-0282(09)00263-
5/abstract (published online April 1, 2009).  
49 Id.  
50 Lauren Isley, M.S., C.G.C., et al., Genetic evaluation procedures at sperm banks in the United States, 99 
Fertil. Steril. 1587 (2013). Abstract only available at http://www.fertstert.org/article/S0015-0282(13)00136-
2/abstract (published online February 6, 2013). 
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“majority of US IVF clinics” offered preimplantation genetic diagnosis as a service to 
recipient couples.
51
 A comprehensive survey of the general public, published in 2004 by 
the Genetics and Public Policy Center, asked survey participants about various aspects of 
genetic testing in reproductive medicine but limited the focus to prenatal genetic testing, 
PGD, and carrier testing of parents without differentiating gamete donors.
52
 Regardless, 
many of the survey’s focus group participants believed that carrier testing for genetic 
diseases should be made widely available prior to pregnancy.
53
 
 As seen above, there are various combinations of technique and donated gamete 
that can be used to assist a couple in having a child, and more and more recipient couples 
or individuals are utilizing them. However, the practice of preventative genetic testing or 
screening of gamete donors doesn’t seem to be keeping pace. Furthermore, considering 
the scope of the techniques and the number of parties involved, there is surprisingly 
limited state and federal oversight of these various procedures.  
II. Current Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technologies Using Gamete 
Donors 
 Assisted reproductive technologies are regulated at the state and federal levels; 
various professional associations and accreditation institutions also privately regulate 
tissue banks, infertility clinics and physicians who specialize in assisted reproduction. 
However, the vast majority of these government and private regulations deal with issues 
other than genetic testing. There are very few government requirements for genetic 
                                                        
51 Susannah Baruch, J.D., et al, Genetic testing of embryos: practices and perspectives of US in vitro 
fertilization clinics, 89 Fertil. Steril. 1053 (2008). Abstract only available online at 
http://www.fertstert.org/article/S0015-0282(07)01216-2/abstract (published online July 12, 2007).  
52 Genetics & Public Policy Center, Reproductive Genetic Testing: What America Thinks 4 (2004).  
53 Id. at 24, 37. 
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screening or testing of donated eggs and sperm, and private guidelines are voluntary. 
54
 
With such a noticeable lack of preemptive or proactive regulations for donors, court 
remedies after conception or birth become much more important.  
 A. Existing Regulation at the Federal Level 
 The federal government does regulate ART practitioners through legislation and 
administrative agencies.
55
 The United States Department of Health and Human has the 
authority under the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.) to directly regulate 
ART procedures primarily via the FDA and the CDC. 
56
 These two administrative entities 
regulate the storing and procuring of human tissue and the reporting of ART success 
rates, respectively, but neither emphasize genetic testing as a part of good tissue practice.  
 The CDC’s primary function is to monitor how successful ART procedures are 
and that they are being reported accurately. Under the 1992 Fertility Clinic Success Rate 
and Certification Act, any fertility clinic or ART practitioner has to report to the CDC its 
yearly success rate and how many treatment cycles it performs (regardless of the number 
of patients it treats).
57
 The CDC also established a model program to regulate embryo 
laboratories for states.
58
 However, this model program is voluntary and has not been 
considered effective.
59
 
 The CDC has also attempted to encourage state oversight of ART procedures 
through the States Monitoring Assisted Reproductive Technology Collaborative, a project 
                                                        
54 Luekemeyer, supra note 6 at 414.  
55 Heled, supra note 6 at 249-50.  
56 J. Brad Reich and Dawn Swink, Article, You Can’t Put The Genie Back in the Bottle: Potential Rights 
and Obligations of Egg Donors in the Cyberprocreation Era, 20 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 1, 24 (2010). See 
also 42 U.S.A. 216.  
57 Assisted Reproductive Technology, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,  http://www.cdc.gov/art/, 
last updated February 12, 2013. Also 42 U.S.C.A. Section 263a-1. 
58 Heled, supra note 6 at 250, citing the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act (42 U.S.C. 
§263a-1. .  
59 Heled, supra note 6 at 250.   
 Kilduff 12 
intended to promote increased surveillance of infants born as a result from ART after 
they are born and develop.
60
 While the CDC and, currently, three states (Massachusetts, 
Florida and Michigan) track birth defect and cancer registries of the infants,
61
 there are no 
widely disseminated state reports yet that exclusively analyze the relationship of infants 
with genetic defects and the genetic conditions of sperm or egg donors.  
 While the CDC focuses on the results of ART practice, the Food and Drug 
Administration regulates the procedural aspects of ART. The FDA is authorized under 
the Public Health Service Act to monitor the registration, inspection and donor selection 
practices of any facility that deals with human tissue.
62
 As of 2005 the FDA had three 
codified rules that specified that any facility that dealt with human tissue, including 
sperm and eggs, had to register with the FDA, be open to inspections, and screen all 
human tissue and test all human tissue for specific communicable diseases.
63
 Specifically, 
facilities manufacturing, screening, storing or processing human cells and tissue had to 
register with the FDA,
64
 list the tissues, cells, or tissue products it handled,
65
 screen all 
donors for certain infectious diseases
66
, and maintain FDA approved tissue handling 
practices.
67
 These rules were finalized in 2005.
68
 The donor eligibility provisions specify 
only that the tissue is to be screened and tested only for communicable diseases such as 
                                                        
60 States Monitoring Assisted Reproductive Technology Collaborative, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, http://www.cdc.gov/art/SMART.htm# (last updated July 24, 2012). 
61 Id.  
62 Eligibility Determination for Donors of Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products, 
69 Fed. Reg. 29,786, 29,787 (May 25, 2004)(to be codified at 21 CFR 210, 211, 820, and 1271). 
63 21 CFR 1271.1 and Donor Eligibility Final Rule and GuId..ance Questions and Answers, Food and Drug 
Administration, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/TissueTissueProducts/QuestionsaboutTissues/ucm102842.ht
m (last visited May 10, 2013). 
64 21 CFR 1271.21 
65 21 CFR 1271.25 
66 21 CFR 1271.75; 21 CFR 1271.80 
67 21 CFR 1271.150 
68 Note 63 supra.  
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HIV.
69
 Reproductive tissue is also screened for chlamydia and gonorreah, two sexually 
transmitted diseases.
70
 There is no current FDA rule that requires any fertility clinic, 
tissue bank or other facility that handles human reproductive tissue to screen it or test it 
for genetic diseases.
71
 
 B. Existing Regulation at the State Level 
 While some states have put in place laws requiring donor semen and oocytes to be 
screened for HIV,
72
 only two states, New York and Ohio, explicitly require ART 
practitioners to screen or test gamete donors for genetic diseases.
73
 New York regulations 
require facilities dealing with reproductive tissue donors to screen through a detailed 
medical history for “major genetic disorders,” 74  and also requires donors who have 
indicated there is a family or personal history of Tay-Sachs disease, thalassemia, cystic 
fibrosis and/or sickle cell disease to be genetically tested.
75
 Ohio law requires that a 
physician, physician’s assistant, nurse, or nurse practitioner has to take a “complete 
medical history of the donor, including, but not limited to, any available genetic history 
of the donor,” in order to use donor sperm in artificial insemination.76  
 By contrast, several states have statutory provisions that actually shield ART 
practitioners from liability. For instance, many states have “blood shield laws” which 
prevent plaintiffs from bringing product liability or negligence claims for injuries 
                                                        
69 21 CFR 1271.3(r) 
70 21 CFR 1271.75(c) 
71 Heled, supra note 6, at 253-54. 
72 E.g., VA Code Ann. § 32.1-45.3.  
73 Heled, supra note 6 at 255.  
74 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 52-8.5(b)(2) 
75 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 52-8.6(h) 
76 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3111.91(B)(1)(a)(West 2013) 
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resulting from infected or botched blood transfusions.
77
 While some of these state statutes 
apply specifically to blood and blood products, others encompass other types of human 
tissue.
78
 Moreover, Georgia also has a broad statute that exempts a physician from civil 
actions, other than those for negligence, for performing artificial insemination.
79
 In short, 
the overwhelming majority of states have either not considered the genetic risks of ART 
or have chosen to exempt ART practitioners from certain types of liability.  
 C. Existing Regulation by Private Institutions 
 The most rigorous regulations for genetic testing of donors are set out by private 
associations and accreditation institutions. The two principle associations dealing with 
ART practice are the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) and the 
affiliated Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART).
80
 These guidelines call 
for genetic testing and screening of donor sperm and donor eggs for major diseases such 
as cystic fibrosis.
81
 ASRM is merely a professional accreditation association, however, so 
while it promulgates guidelines to its members, they are voluntary and not required to be 
followed.
82
 
 III. The Case Precedent and What It Means for ART Families  
 There are only a small number of cases that have been brought by recipient 
couples after their child has inherited a disease from a sperm or egg donor. In general, 
these cases reflect a growing concern of courts as to how to treat such claims, which do 
                                                        
77 Jennifer M. Vagle, Comment, Putting the Product in Reproduction: The Viability of a Products Liability 
Action for Genetically Defective Sperm, 38 Pepp. L. Rev. 1175, 1219-20 (2011).  
78 Id. at. 1220, citing, e.g., Ind. Code. Ann. §16-41-12-11(a).  
79 Id. at 1205, citing Ga. Code. Ann. §43-34-37(b). 
80 The Practice Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine and the Practice Committee 
of the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology, Recommendations for Gamete and Embryo 
Donation: A Committee Opinion. 99 FERTIL. STERIL. 47 (2013). 
81 Note 80 supra at 49, 55.  
82 Luetkemeyer, supra note 6 at 414.  
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not fall neatly under a particular theory of tort or contract law. The plaintiffs below 
brought many different causes of action against ART practitioners, and the courts have 
had opportunities to examine several recurring theories of liability, the most common of 
which is “straight” and professional negligence, products liability, and wrongful life or 
wrongful birth.  
 A. Stiver v. Parker 
 This case from the early 1990s involves a contagious rather than genetic disease 
and actually does not involve a child born from a gamete donor – although the parties 
certainly intended him to be so. However, it’s a helpful early case to look at negligence 
claims for children born with donor-related diseases. In this case of first impression, the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit examined the liability of a surrogacy broker and 
ART practitioners for negligence. The plaintiff, a Michigan woman named Judith Stiver, 
was a surrogate who agreed to bear a child for a man named Alexander Malahoff.
83
 Stiver 
contracted with Malahoff to bear his child through a “surrogacy broker” who worked in 
conjunction with several medical and legal professionals.
84
 The surrogacy agreement 
required “both parties to undergo a complete physical and genetic evaluation, under the 
direction and supervision of a licensed physician, to determine whether the physical 
health and well being of each is satisfactory.”85 Beyond the contract, however, there were 
no follow-up procedures that tracked whether or not Malahoff or Stiver ever actually 
received counseling or testing of any kind.
86
 Although Stiver was encouraged to see her 
independent obstetrician, she was also obligated to sign the surrogacy agreement on the 
                                                        
83 Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261, 263 (6th Cir. 1992).  
84 Id. at 264.  
85 Id. at 265. 
86 Id. at 265-66.  
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same day that she first read it, and only saw the participating doctors and counselors days 
before she was inseminated with the untested semen of Malahoff.
87
 
 Stiver was also married, and the child she gave birth to turned out to be the 
biological child of her husband, not Malahoff’s.88 However, the child had severe and 
permanent birth defects as a result of Stiver’s exposure to cytomegalovirus, a 
communicable disease that is carried through semen.
89
 The Stivers, believing that 
Malahoff’s untested semen was the source of Judith’s exposure, sued the surrogacy 
broker as well as four doctors and an additional involved lawyer for negligence.
90
 The 
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants, and the Stivers appealed.
91
 
 The Sixth Circuit admitted it was in “uncharted waters” but decided the surrogacy 
broker and the participating physicians were not merely exercising the standard of care 
typical to regular obstetric practice, but had all voluntarily entered the highly specific 
business of locating and inseminating surrogates, and would all see a profit from a 
successful surrogacy.
92
 Therefore, under Michigan law, the defendants met the standard 
of having a “special relationship” with the plaintiff, and owed her an affirmative duty of 
care to protect her from foreseeable harm.
93
 Their current surrogacy practices and the 
generality of the surrogacy agreement, as well as the defendants’ failure to test 
Malahoff’s semen, raised a material issue of fact as to a breach of that affirmative duty 
                                                        
87 Id. at 266, 268.  
88 Id. at 263. 
89 Id. at 263 and n5.  
90 Id. at 264.  
91 Id. at 264. 
92 Id. at 268.  
93 Id.  
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and causation, and the Stivers could continue to pursue their claim.
94
  
 B. Johnson v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County (I) and (II) 
 The California state courts were some of the first to consider an action against a 
sperm bank after a child was born with a disease inherited from the sperm donor. Diane 
and Ronald Johnson conceived their daughter Brittany using frozen donor semen 
provided to them by California Cryobank, Inc.
95
 California Cryobank assured the 
Johnsons that the semen had been “fully tested and genetically screened.” 96  It also 
required the Johnsons to sign an agreement that stated that since the donor was to remain 
anonymous, Cryobank would destroy the donor’s records.97 
 Brittany was diagnosed with Autosomal Dominant Polycystic Kidney Disease 
(ADPKD) roughly six years after she was born.
98
 It was determined that the sperm donor 
used to conceive her had transmitted the disease to her.
99
 The Johnsons allegedly learned 
that their sperm donor had in fact informed California Cryobank physicians at the time of 
his donation that his mother an a maternal aunt both suffered from kidney disease as well 
as other symptoms that were indicative of ADKPD.
100
 Despite this, the Johnsons claimed 
that Cryobank and its affiliated physicians never followed up with testing of the semen, 
that they were never informed prior to artificial insemination of any issues with their 
donor and that California Cryobank assured them the semen had been tested and screened 
for genetic disorders.
101
 They then sued California Cryobank for professional negligence, 
                                                        
94 Id. at 269.  
95 Johnson v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles, 95 Cal. Rptr.2d 864, 867 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2000), review denied 
124 Cal. Rptr.2d 650 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). 
96 Id. at 867.  
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 867-68. 
99 Id. at 868.  
100 Id.  
101 Id. 
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fraud, and breach of contract.
102
 
 In the Johnson’s first reported court proceeding, the California Court of Appeals 
granted a writ of mandate to decide whether the Johnsons had a right to get the name, 
contact information and medical history from California Cryobank for their sperm 
donor.
103
 The Court of Appeals decided that the California Code of Civil Procedure 
permitted the Johnsons to pursue all “relevant” discovery that revealed the donor’s 
information.
104
 They also determined that the anonymous sperm donor was not shielded 
by any privileged doctor-patient relationship with California Cryobank, and that public 
policy concerns outweighed his contractual right to anonymity and his constitutional right 
to privacy.
105
 The court tried to strike a balance between the rights of the Johnsons and 
the rights of the donor by allowing the petitioners to take the donor’s deposition and 
examine his personal and family medical history and relationship with California 
Cryobank, but “only as to those issues which are relevant to the pending litigation.”106   
 In the second Johnson case in 2002, the Court of Appeals examined a second writ 
of mandate brought by the Johnsons, and dealt with substantive issues of the case.
107
 One 
of the key issues the court examined on its second pass was whether or not California 
Cryobank as an entity was considered a “health care provider” for the purposes of a 
medical malpractice suit.
108
 Interestingly, the Johnsons took the position that California 
Cryobank was not a health care provider, since if it fell under California’s statutory 
                                                        
102 Id. at 867. 
103 Id. at 870.  
104 Id. at 871.  
105 Id. at 873, 877.  
106 Id. at 879. 
107 Johnson v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles, 124 Cal. Rptr.2d 650 (Cal. Dist. App. 2002) 
108 Id. at 653 
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definition then they would be procedurally barred from claiming punitive damages.
109
 
The court, however, disagreed and decided that California Cryobank was a health care 
provider under the California Code of Civil Procedure, because it dispensed a product 
linked to human healthcare.
110
 
 Furthermore, the Court held Brittany Johnson’s claim for general damages and 
loss of earnings to be the same as a claim for “wrongful life,” a tort not generally 
recognized in California.
111
 The court characterized the claim for wrongful life as stating 
that if not for the negligent (or fraudulent, etc.) actions of the defendant, the child never 
would have been born.
112
 The Court also very briefly addressed the issue of causation in 
Brittany’s claim against California Cryobank and the physicians, stating only that “…it 
cannot be said that Cryobank, Sims and Rothman caused Brittany’s inherited 
abnormalities by improperly approving Donor No. 276 as a sperm donor. Brittany’s 
kidney condition was caused by the gene contained within the sperm provided by Donor 
No. 276.”113  
 However, as described below, not all jurisdictions have followed Johnson’s 
outright denial of damages.  
 C. Paretta v. Medical Offices for Human Reproduction 
 The plaintiffs, Josephine and Gerard Paretta, brought an action on behalf of 
themselves and their daughter Theresa against Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center 
and affiliated fertility clinics as well as two individual physicians after Theresa was born 
                                                        
109 Id. at 660, 664. 
110 Id. at 660-61.  
111 Id. at 666. 
112 Id. 
113 Id.  
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with cystic fibrosis inherited from the egg donor used to conceive her.
114
 The principal 
fertility clinic’s practice was to prescreen egg donors for some genetic diseases, including 
cystic fibrosis.
115
 The Parettas selected an egg donor through the defendants’ Ovum 
Donor Program and conceived Theresa using the donor’s egg and Gerard Paretta’s 
semen.
116
 
 Cystic fibrosis is a condition that must be inherited from both parents in order to 
manifest itself in a child.
117
 Therefore, both the egg donor and Mr. Paretta were carriers 
of the disease.
118
 Although the clinic had tested the donated egg for cystic fibrosis, the 
Parettas alleged the clinic never informed them that the egg donor was a carrier.
119
 
Moreover, at no time did the clinic test Mr. Paretta to see if he was a carrier as well.
120
 
The Parettas brought a claim of medical malpractice against the clinic and its 
participating doctors, as well as claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and 
loss of consortium.
121
 The clinic then moved to dismiss the Parettas’ Complaint.122  
 Looking at case precedent, the New York Supreme Court decided that Theresa 
Paretta did not have legal standing as a plaintiff, as allowing her claim was comparable to 
a claim for “wrongful life,” which is not recognized in New York.123  The Court stated 
that to allow Theresa to recover based on acts that occurred before she was conceived 
“would give children conceived with the help of modern medical technology more rights 
                                                        
114 Paretta v. Med. Offices for Human Reproduction, 760 N.Y.S.2d 639, 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).  
115 Id.  
116 Id.  
117 Id. at 641-42. 
118 Id. at 642.  
119 Id.  
120 Id.  
121 Id.  
122 Id. at 643.  
123 Id. at 645-47.  
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and expectations than children conceived without medical assistance.”124 Furthermore, 
the court said that the Paretta parents could not recover from the defendants for their 
emotional distress.
125
  
 However, the Court emphasized that the Parettas had stated a relationship 
between the acts of the defendant fertility clinic and doctors and Theresa’s resulting 
disease, and that if supported by the evidence, the actions of the doctors could be 
negligent or even fraudulent, and that the Parettas were entitled to pursue both 
compensatory damages for Theresa’s treatment expenses and punitive damages in 
court.
126
 The case ultimately settled for $1.3 million.
127
 
 D. Donovan v. Idant Laboratories 
 Donna Donovan entered a contract with the sperm bank Idant Laboratories to be 
artificially inseminated with semen that Idant stored and sold.
128
 As part of the 
agreement, Idant provided Donovan with a consent form that stated “(1) semen stored at 
Idant is exceptionally safe; (2) Idant has a screening program that far exceeds mandated 
standards; and (3) Idant's donors go through a rigorous screening process to ensure that 
they have a good genetic background and history.”129 Donovan signed the consent form, 
selected a sperm donor whom she believed had been adequately tested, and was 
artificially inseminated.
130
 Her daughter (like the Johnson’s daughter, also named 
Brittany) was born with Fragile X syndrome, an inherited developmental disorder.
131
 
                                                        
124 Id. at 646. 
125 Id. at 645.  
126 Id. at 647-48. 
127 Heled, supra note 6 at 8. 
128 Donovan v. Idant Labs., 625 F.Supp. 2d 256, 262 (E.D. Pa. 2009), review denied 374 Fed.Appx. 319, 
2010 WL 1257705(3d. Cir. 2010). 
129 Id.  
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 263. 
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Donna Donovan was not a carrier of Fragile X, and the sperm donor was determined to 
be the carrier.
132
 
  On behalf of herself and Brittany, she brought nine claims encompassing 
negligence and product liability theory as well as contract doctrine: “negligence, breach 
of contract, third-party beneficiary breach of contract, breach of the express warranty of 
merchantability, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, third-party beneficiary 
breach of express and implied warranties of merchantability, negligent misrepresentation, 
strict products liability and negligent infliction of emotional distress for selling defective 
sperm to Donna Donovan.”133 The case was complicated by questions of appropriate 
venue and the applicable statute of limitations; ultimately, Donna Donovan was barred 
from bringing her claims due to the statute of limitations expiring.
134
 
 However, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania did discuss 
the merits of Brittany Donovan’s actions as well, and left open the possibility of future 
products liability actions for sales of sperm that carried genetic disease.
135
 Under the 
theory that “wrongful life” was not a recognizable claim under New York law (the choice 
of law applied), Brittany Donovan’s claims for negligence and negligent 
misrepresentation were dismissed.
136
 However, finding that New York law did not 
specifically exempt reproductive human tissue from being categorized as a product for 
strict liability purposes, the court decided the Donovans’ strict products liability claim 
could withstand a motion to dismiss.
137
 The Court did not elaborate on the merits of the 
                                                        
132 Id.  
133 Id. at 262. 
134 Id. at 264-65, 268. 
135 Vagle, supra note 77, at 1212.  
136 Id. at 271. 
137 Id. at 273. 
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strict liability claim, but it did “touch on [the] important distinction” that the strict 
liability claims were against Idant as a vendor and not as a healthcare provider.
138
 
 These four cases demonstrate all plaintiffs are willing to bring an extensive 
variety of claims in order to try and recover for the birth of a child with a genetic 
disorder. However, a common claim brought by all of the plaintiffs was negligence, 
whether it was against a ART practitioner or a sperm bank. The merits and problems of 
negligence claims regarding gamete donors with genetic diseases is discussed in the next 
section. 
IV. Crafting a Claim the Courts Will Accept 
 As discussed above, a common claim among all of the cases above is that of 
negligence, whether it stands on its own, as in Stiver, falls under the tort theories of 
medical malpractice or products liability as in Paretta, Johnson and Donovan, or ends up 
paralleling the tort of wrongful life or birth, it is appears in all of the cases. The elements 
of negligence seem to apply to the fact patterns presented in the cases described in the 
above section. However, there are various hurdles for plaintiffs to consider before 
bringing a similar negligence claim to court, and it is especially helpful for families 
bringing these actions to understand the basic tenets of these claims (and why some 
courts are unwilling to accept them). First, an overview of the relevant law is in order. 
Recommendations then follow for how families can proceed in civil court.  
 A. What is the current law?  
 Negligence  
                                                        
138 Daniel Park, Select Recent Court Decisions, 36 Am. J.L. & Med. 682, 684 (2010).  
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 Of the above cases, the negligence claim brought by the Stivers in Stiver v. Parker 
most parallels the tort of “classic” negligence. 139  A plaintiff can claim that the 
defendant’s negligence caused the plaintiff’s physical or emotional harm.140 Negligence 
that causes physical harm has five elements: a duty owed by the party allegedly at fault to 
the person injured, a breach of that duty (“failure to exercise reasonable care”), cause, an 
actual resulting injury, and “proximate cause.” 141  Proximate cause means that the 
resulting harm must fall within “the scope of the risk” of the unreasonable conduct.142 In 
other words, the resulting harm or injury has to be a reasonable or sensible effect of the 
tortious conduct
143; it cannot be an attenuated or freak consequence of someone’s actions.  
 Negligence that causes emotional harm includes the same elements as above, but 
has some limitations, since emotional harm is more difficult to show.
144
 Emotional harm 
is considered “impairment or injury to a person’s emotional tranquility.”145 In order for 
the injured party to show that someone’s negligent conduct resulted in their emotional 
harm, he generally must show either that he was also in immediate physical danger and 
that in turn caused his emotional harm, or that the liable party was negligent in a situation 
where it was extremely likely that negligence would cause emotional harm (for instance, 
in a hospital morgue, where the attendant negligently misidentifies the body and then 
notifies the wrong victim’s family).146 
                                                        
139 Stiver, 975 F.2d at 264.  
140 Restatement (Third) of Torts § 45(2012). 
141 Restatement (Third) of Torts  § 6 (2012). 
142 Restatement (Third) of Torts  § 29 (2012); see also Restatement (Second)of Torts § 281(1965).  
143 See Palsgraf v. Long Island RR. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 353-54, 104-04 (N.Y. 1928) is 
consId..ered one of the landmark cases describing the concept of proximate cause.  
144 Restatement (Third) of Torts§ 45 cmt. a, b (2012). 
145 Restatement (Third) of Torts§ 45(2012). 
146 Restatement (Third) of Torts § 47 cmt. f (2012); see also Consol. Rail Corp.v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 
547-48 (1994).  
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 A party can also claim emotional harm caused by witnessing physical harm 
(according to the Restatement (Third) of Torts, “serious bodily injury”) happen to another 
person.
147
 In order to uphold this claim, the injured party has to either have witnessed the 
physical harm while it was happening or be a close family member to the victim.
148
 
Although it is not described in the cases, this may have been the theory the plaintiff 
parents were proceeding under in Donovan and Paretta when they made claims of 
emotional distress.
149
  
 Negligence is considered an action governed by state law
150
, and so one can see 
variations on negligence depending on the jurisdiction in these cases. For instance, in 
Stiver, the Sixth Circuit found that the surrogacy broker owed Judy Stiver an “affirmative 
duty” of protection. 151  An affirmative duty under Michigan law is considered a 
heightened duty under a negligence theory that arises from a “special relationship” 
between two parties, and requires one party to not merely “exercise reasonable care” but 
actually protect the other party from harm.
152
 Although the court in Stiver acknowledged 
that the heightened responsibilities of an “affirmative duty” didn’t generally fall under 
negligence claims, here the circumstances justified finding that responsibility.
153
 
 A more specific theory of negligence applies when making claims against 
physicians or other healthcare practitioners. These claims of medical malpractice 
incorporate the elements of traditional negligence but require the injured party to show 
                                                        
147 Restatement (Third) of Torts § 48(2012). 
148  Id. 
149 Paretta, 760 N.Y.S.2d at 642; Donovan, 625 F. Supp.2d at 264.  
150 The landmark case Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75-76 (1938) arose from a personal injury 
action and establishes that federal courts must defer to the common law of the states, including negligence 
and contract law.  
151 Stiver, 975 F.2d at 268.  
152 Id. at  270, see also Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc., 418 N.W.2d 381, 382, 384 (Mich. 1988) 
153 Stiver, 975 F.2d at 270.  
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that the healthcare provider breached their duty to provide reasonable medical care, with 
“reasonableness” defined by the standard of care in the medical profession.154   The 
plaintiff parents specifically targeted their healthcare practitioners with medical 
malpractice claims in Paretta and Johnson.
155
  
 Finally, there is a theory of negligence that the courts in all of the above-described 
cases considered – the theory of “wrongful life.”156 Wrongful life is a controversial tort in 
the United States and its meaning appears to be elusive, but it is integral for potential 
plaintiffs to understand what its overall elements are, and what it means to courts in 
particular jurisdictions.  
 When does a claim for negligence become a claim for wrongful life? 
 The concept of wrongful life in the ART context has been described as a 
“paradox. If offspring are ‘harmed’ by being born in those [risky or poor] conditions, 
then the only way to prevent the harm is not to use those [ART] techniques. But this 
means that the children sought to be protected will never be born.”157 
 Wrongful life is generally defined as the claim that a child would never have been 
born but for the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor.
158
 However, there are many variations 
on this theme, depending on the jurisdiction. For some, the claim alleges “that the 
                                                        
154 Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Standard of Care Owed to Patient by Medical Specialist as Determined by 
Local, “Like Community,” State, National, or Other Standards, 18 A.L.R. 4th 603 (2011). See also Molloy 
v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 717 (Minn., 2004)( A medical malpractice action is based on principles of tort 
liability for negligence…”); Borillo v. Beekman Downtown Hospital, 537 N.Y.S.2d 219, 220 (N.Y.A.D. 2 
Dept. 1989)(“When the duty owing to a patient by a practitioner or medical facility arises from the 
physician-patient relationship or is substantially related to medical treatment, the breach thereof gives rise 
to an action sounding in medical malpractice as opposed to simple negligence [citation omitted]”). 
155 Johnson, 95 Cal.Rptr. 2d at 867; Paretta, 760 N.Y.S.2d at 642.  
156 Reich and Swink, supra note 56 at 63.  
157 John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 7, 14 (2004).  
158 Gregory G. Sarno, Tort Liability for Wrongfully Causing One to Be Born, 83 A.L.R. 3d 15 (2011). 
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physician's negligence precluded any parental decision to abort the fetus."
159
 In other 
states like New York, the tort of wrongful life is also described as the claim that, but for 
the defendant’s tortious acts, a child would never have been conceived.160 The tort has 
also been classified in the genetic counseling context as  “an informational one; [footnote 
omitted] the physician must provide accurate genetic counseling in keeping with 
professional standards of care, [footnote omitted] or face liability for the consequences 
proximately caused by such failure.”161 
 To confuse matters more, the tort of “wrongful life” is considered the same as the 
tort of “wrongful birth” in some jurisdictions, while other jurisdictions recognize 
“wrongful birth” as a tort distinguishable from wrongful life.162 Many states reject the 
torts of wrongful life and wrongful birth as legal claims either through judicial decisions 
or by state statute.
163
  
 Why? Courts seem to recognize shades of difference between a negligence claim, 
a wrongful life and/or a wrongful birth claim based on the damages sought and who is 
seeking them. Some courts “have refused to award damages in such instances on the 
ground, generally speaking, that it is extremely difficult, if not absolutely impossible, for 
the judiciary to evaluate in pecuniary terms the philosophical problem of being versus 
nothingness.”164 However, this is not always the case. Because there is so little uniformity 
as to how these cases are considered across jurisdictions, it’s helpful to examine 
individual judicial opinions.  
                                                        
159 Francis Sohn, Products Liability and the Fertility Industry: Overcoming Some Problems in Wrongful 
Life, 44 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145, 159 (2011).  
160 Paretta, 760 N.Y.S.2d at 644.  
161 Sohn, supra note 157 at 159. 
162 Sarno, supra note 156.  
163 Reich and Swink, supra note 56 at 63. See also, e.g., the Minnesota statute M.S.C. §145.424, which 
prohibits actions of both wrongful life and wrongful birth from being brought in Minnesota courts.  
164 Sarno, supra note 156.  
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 In the cases described in Section III, each opinion voiced a concern over whether 
claims brought on behalf of the afflicted child were considered logically or unethically 
untenable. In Johnson v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (I), the court stated that 
claims brought on behalf of Brittany Johnson were properly barred as a claim for 
“wrongful life” because in essence, she was seeking recovery for negligent actions that 
caused her to born.
165
 The California court interpreted this to mean that there was a causal 
relationship between the negligence of the defendant ART physicians in failing to test the 
donor’s sperm and Brittany’s illness, which it considered illogical.166 The court also did 
not recognize a difference between a claim for a wrongful birth and, as the Johnsons 
argued, a claim for wrongful conception.
167
 As a result, the California Court of Appeals 
held the child Brittany had no standing to sue.
168
  
 However, the court was careful in Johnson to distinguish the Johnson’s result 
from that of Turpin v. Sortini, an earlier California case.
169
 Although Turpin did not 
involve a gamete donor, it did set a standard for recovery for children born with genetic 
diseases. In Turpin, the parents of a deaf child claimed that their physicians misinformed 
them that their child’s deafness was hereditary, and as a result conceived a second child 
who was also born deaf.
170
 While the court in Turpin was unwilling to award the child 
general damages on a claim for “wrongful life,” it did allow both the parents and child to 
recover calculable damages for the cost of the child’s care.171  
 This standard was narrowed in Paretta, where the New York Supreme Court did 
                                                        
165 Johnson, 124 Cal.Rptr. 2d at 666.  
166 Id. at 665-66.  
167 Id. at 665-66.  
168 Id. at 666.  
169 Id. at 664-65.  
170 Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 956 (Cal. 1982).  
171 Id. at 966.  
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not even directly address the issue of whether the child Theresa Paretta’s claims were for 
“wrongful life” or “wrongful” birth, but relied on case precedent that allowed for actual 
damages to the parents of a child claiming wrongful life or wrongful birth, but no 
damages for the child herself.
172
 Thus Paretta stated that only parents can recover where 
a physician’s negligence has resulted in the birth of a sick child.173 However, by awarding 
the same type of damages to parents regardless of whether the child was already 
conceived, as in Paretta, the courts may have defeated their own reasoning in denying 
what they consider “wrongful life” claims.174  
 New York law was then applied to the child Brittany Donovan’s negligence 
claims in Donovan v. Idant Laboratories, and Brittany was barred from bringing a claim 
for negligence because her claim was essentially one for “wrongful life.”175 The United 
States District Court for the District of Pennsylvania reasoned that while the sperm 
bank’s negligence might have led to Donna Donovan simply choosing another donor and 
having a healthy child as opposed to no child at all, Brittany would not have been born 
with her specific “genetic identity” and therefore was attempting to claim damages for 
being born with a genetic illness.
176
 
 Other state courts, however, have drawn different distinctions between various 
claims on behalf of a child born with a genetic disease. In New Jersey, the state Superior 
Court relied on New Jersey Supreme Court precedent and drew a clear line between 
claims that alleged negligence causing prenatal injury and claims for negligent genetic 
                                                        
172 Paretta, 760 N.Y.S.2d at 645. 
173 Id. at 647. 
174 Daniel Park, supra note 136 at 685.  
175 Donovan, 625 F.Supp. 2d at 271.  
176 Id.  
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counseling that caused parents to make a misinformed decision not to abort a child.
177
 It 
considered the latter a “wrongful birth” claim.178 It also allowed parents and children to 
recover “the normal measure of damages” for such a claim, including damages for 
emotional harm.
179
  
 Minnesota law recognizes an even more specific distinction between negligence 
claims involving children born with genetic disease due to negligence and children 
conceived with genetic disease due to negligence. In Molloy v. Meier, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court answered the certified question of whether an action by parents alleging 
that negligence led to them conceiving a second child was considered a claim for 
“wrongful life” or “wrongful birth” and thus barred by Minnesota statute. 180  The 
Supreme Court determined that while a claim alleging that negligence prevented parents 
from aborting a child was barred as a claim for wrongful life or wrongful birth, a claim 
alleging that negligence caused parents to conceive a sick child fell under neither tort and 
was allowed.
181
 
 In short, the tort of “wrongful life” means different things to different courts. For 
some it seems to encompass a number of claims relating to the birth of an ill child; for 
others it requires a narrow and specific fact pattern. Any parent who wishes to bring a 
claim for negligence that resulted in their child’s genetic disease needs to understand the 
law of their state very well and tread carefully.  
 B.  Recommendations 
                                                        
177 Geler v. Akawie, 818 A.2d 402, 413 (N.J.Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003), citing Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 
421, 432-33 (1979).  
178 Id. at 411. 
179 Id. at 412.  
180 Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 722 (Minn., 2004) 
181 Id. at 723.  
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 As evidenced above, courts have yet to come up with clear guidelines as to how 
these cases will be handled, and these claims raise complicated questions about the cause-
and-effect relationships between gamete donor selection, ART procedures, parental 
decisions and the child’s birth. Parents seeking to bring a negligence claim in court 
against an ART practitioner for children with inherited diseases from a gamete donor 
have to be willing to take the time to carefully construct their legal theories. 
 First, parents should consider whether their state recognizes a heightened duty 
between an ART facility or fertility clinic and the recipient couple, as Michigan did in 
Stiver.
182
 If so, then the parents may be able to claim that the fertility clinic owes them a 
duty to protect from foreseeable harm, which in turn could translate into a duty to 
carefully screen gamete donors from genetic disease.  
 Parents need to make a related inquiry as to whether or not their ART physician 
or practitioner was following the acceptable standard of care under a medical malpractice 
theory. This could be tricky, since the surveys referenced in Section I suggest that genetic 
testing of donors is not standard practice in the ART industry.
183
 Furthermore, even if 
genetic testing or screening is the practice for a particular clinic or donor bank, the 
parents need to check for which diseases the clinic or bank screens. “Even in retrospect, it 
is difficult to envision a practical screening protocol that could reliably target the entire 
multitude of genetically transmitted diseases that could arise in such clinical 
circumstances.”184 
 Parents also need to know whether or not state case law has allowed parents to 
recover for emotional harm. For instance, while the parents of Theresa Paretta were 
                                                        
182 Stiver, 975. F.2d at 268.  
183 Notes 50 and 51 supra. 
184 Marron, supra note 1 at 1684.  
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barred from seeking damages for emotional distress,
185
 the parents in Geler v. Akawie 
were allowed to seek those damages,
186
 and the court in Geler even stated that damages 
for emotional harm were an integral part of the remedy for legal claims involving 
children born with genetic disease due to faulty genetic counseling.
187
 
 Finally, parents need to understand what the court considers to be a “wrongful 
life” claim in their jurisdiction, and whether those claims are barred. This is undoubtedly 
the largest hurdle to overcome in bringing an effective claim against an ART practitioner, 
as it incorporates the tricky elements of causation. However, if the cases described above 
are indicative of what courts will decide in future cases, then parents should consider 
what claims they can bring on their own behalf rather than what claims they can bring on 
behalf of their child, who may not have standing to sue. They should take care to show a 
causal relationship not between the ART facility’s negligence in securing the donor 
gamete and the child’s birth, but between the ART facility’s negligence in securing the 
donor gamete and their (the parent’s) decision to continue with that particular donor’s 
gametes. Furthermore, parents should be prepared to present a calculable claim for 
damages for the care of the child, rather than general damages for pain and suffering 
under a wrongful life theory. While it is possible that a jurisdiction might consider a 
general award of damages that would be greater than actual damages, the likelihood of 
such a decision seems small in light of the case law that has emerged so far, and the goal 
of bringing this type of negligence claim in court is to maximize recovery for the burden 
families will have to bear.  
 
                                                        
185 Paretta, 760 N.Y.S.2d at 647-48. 
186 Geler, 818 A.2d at 414.  
187 Id. at 413. 
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CONCLUSION 
 The medical and legal ramifications from the growing ART industry have yet to 
be fully felt, and it’s clear from the limited case precedent presented in this paper that 
state and federal courts have yet to determine whether or not ART practitioners and 
sperm banks should be held accountable for a child who inherits a genetic disease from a 
donor. If they are to be liable, courts have yet to present a unified theory on how or why. 
However, they have left open some possibilities for affected families. If enough families 
start to bring these types of actions in courts at the state and federal levels, ART 
practitioners may take notice and move for more proactive measures to insure healthy 
ART births.  
 
